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Abstract  
 
 
Public responses to the dissemination of neuroscientific explanations of addiction 
and other mental disorders are an interesting sociocultural phenomenon. We investigated 
how 55 members of the Australian public deliberated on the idea that ‘addiction is a brain 
disease’. Our findings point to the diverse ways in which the public understands and utilises 
this proposition. Interviewees readily accepted that drugs affect brain functioning but were 
ambivalent about whether to label addiction as a ‘disease’. Contrary to the prediction of 
neuroscientific advocates and social science critics, acceptance of a neurobiological 
conception of addiction did not necessarily affect beliefs about addicted persons’ 
responsibility for their addiction. We discuss the theoretical and applied implications of these 
findings. Theoretically, we examine the complexity surrounding how people adopt new 
knowledge and its role in reshaping ethical beliefs. We also discuss the implications of these 
findings for the ethics of communication of neuroscientific information to reduce stigma and 
enhance social support for the treatment of addicted individuals. 
 
Introduction 
 
Public ‘acceptance’ of neuroscientific discourses on addiction: Empirical Evidence 
 
Developments from the fields of neuroscience have the potential to influence how addiction 
is understood, particularly in relation to concepts of ‘mental illness’ and ‘disease’, and 
neuroscientific concepts and language are filtering into public understandings of ‘mental 
illness’ in a variety of ways (Rose, 2007; Bröer and Heerings, 2013). As Angermeyer et al 
(2011) have shown, in a number of OECD countries there has been increased public 
preparedness to accept biogenetic (including neurobiological) explanations of schizophrenia, 
depression and alcohol dependence. However, trends in the public’s acceptance of 
neurobiological information are not uniform across mental disorders (Schnittker, 2008; 
Pescosolido et al, 2010; Easter, 2012; Rüsch et al, 2012). Surveys from North America and 
the United Kingdom show that whereas over three-quarters of the population will label 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and depression as ‘mental illnesses’, only one-half are 
prepared to label alcohol dependence or drug abuse in the same way (Pescosolido et al, 2010; 
Rüsch et al, 2012). Furthermore, there is incomplete concordance between preparedness to 
describe conditions as ‘mental illnesses’ and to accept neurobiological explanations of them 
(Pescosolido et al, 2010; Rüsch et al, 2012).  
 
Commentators have expressed a range of views on the desirability of encouraging the public 
to embrace a neurobiological understanding of addiction. These range from optimistic beliefs 
in the ability of neuroscience to provide greater medical treatment of addiction and drug use 
(for example, Leshner, 1997) to concerns that neuroscientific explanations and treatments 
may marginalise other approaches to knowing and treating addiction and may limit 
responsibility to the addicted person (for example, Dingel et al, 2011). Some leading 
researchers have argued that increased public acceptance of a neurobiological conception of 
addiction will have important ethical implications for reducing stigma and thereby improving 
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treatment outcomes for addicted individuals (Lebowitz and Ahn, 2012), beliefs that are used 
to justify neuroscience education campaigns (Vrecko, 2010a). Some empirical studies support 
the possibility of realising the destigmatising aspirations of addiction neuroscience 
proponents (Furnham and Rees, 1988; Mehta and Farina, 1997), whereas more recent studies 
do not (Lam et al, 2005; Angermeyer et al, 2011). 
 
The social operation of neuroscientific discourse: Interpreting ‘acceptance’ 
 
One rationale for thinking that a neurobiological conception of addiction will reduce stigma 
is described by attribution theory. Attribution theory suggests that “low causal responsibility 
for a stigmatized characteristic […] is associated with less blame and more positive 
emotions” (Phelan, 2005, p. 309). In other words, the assignation of blame for an outcome 
(for example, becoming or remaining addicted) will diminish if the behaviour is attributed to 
a characteristic over which an individual is considered to have limited control (for example, 
ones genetically determined constitution) (Phelan, 2005). However, as Phelan (2005) herself 
has demonstrated, a biological conception of mental illness may have multiple moral effects, 
including stigmatisation, particularly if the behaviour is seen as untreatable and the affected 
person is seen as likely to cause harm (Phelan and Link, 2012). 
 
In a more general sense, Rose (2007) too has suggested a close relationship between holding 
certain understandings of the body and the shaping of a new style of ethics, which he terms 
somatic ethics. Although careful to note that such knowledge has not completely displaced 
older understandings, Rose emphasises how biological understandings have come to 
dominate other forms of public knowledge and subjects’ (normative) beliefs in ways that both 
construct and impel certain kinds of governance of ‘biological citizens’. The project of 
disseminating scientific knowledge to the public is one vehicle for this that Rose identifies, 
and such a mindset appears explicitly evident in some neuroscientists’ advocacy of the 
enhancement of public understandings (Lebowitz and Ahn, 2012). 
 
In contrast, a number of authors have emphasised the limitations of new biological 
understandings, suggesting that biogenetic and neurobiological discourses may be 
incorporated into existing understandings of personhood, health and illness in dynamic and 
nondeterministic ways (Schnittker, 2008; Easter, 2012). O’Connor and Joffe (2013) point out 
that the impact of neuroscientific knowledge cannot be assessed by focussing solely on the 
uptake of neuroscientific narratives, but rather by looking at how individuals reconcile these 
narratives with pre-existing narratives of personhood. On the other hand, Vrecko (2010a, b) 
illustrates the importance of understanding the social and historical contexts that have 
produced addiction neuroscience. Finally, as Pickersgill et al (2011) state, although the brain 
is an object of interest and significance for many, it is not “some magnificent epicentre of 
subjectivity, but [rather] an object of mundane significance” (p. 362). In a variety of ways, 
these scholars problematise the idea that public acceptance of neuroscientific understandings 
will entail the ethical and social effects, promised by their proponents or feared by their 
critics, in a linear or deterministic fashion. 
 
 
 
Given the complex ways in which new discourses may be adopted, how do we understand 
what public acceptance of neurobiological understandings will mean? In theorising how 
neuroscientific discourse operates in relation to pre-existing discourses, Pickersgill et al 
(2011, p. 362) draw upon the metaphorical bricoleur (the bricklayer) to describe how 
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individuals assemble discourses (including neuroscientific discourses) out of older ones. 
Bricolage evokes a systematic building of diverse discourses in shaping a solid body of 
knowledge, beliefs or practice. Bröer and Heerings (2013) offer a discourse resonance model 
to understand how individuals integrate or reject novel perspectives. They focus on the 
agency of the individuals in their selection of publically circulating explanations based on 
how well they resonate – consonantly, dissonantly or autonomously – with their pre-existing 
understandings. While conceptualising how neuroscientific and other discourses may be 
integrated, such theories have not explained how ontological and normative conceptions 
interact. While Rose (2007) explains how new biological understandings – where biology is 
no longer taken to be immutable – foster a new kind of ethics, those who offer context-based 
accounts of the impact of neuroscientific knowledge have not offered an alternative 
explanation as to how new understandings of personhood and the body relate to normative 
judgements. Latour’s (2008) idea of the ‘cautious designer’ offers a useful 
reconceptualisation of Levi-Strauss’ bricoleur in thinking of how certain kinds of personhood 
may be influenced by neuroscientific discourses as well as particular ethical concerns. In 
contrast to the bricklayer, the designer compiles discourse by refashioning less solid 
ontologies and identities for symbolic, utilitarian, ethical and aesthetic reasons. The 
designer’s ethical pre-conceptions may, therefore, shape their ontological conceptions of the 
body as much as their ethical beliefs derive from their ontological ones. To understand the 
‘cautious designer’, one need not offer an account of dominant cultural narratives or ‘read’ 
shifting cultural norms but look to explain certain cause and effect relationships in the way 
discourses are comprised. 
 
 
Here, we investigated what ‘acceptance’ of the idea that addiction is a brain disease entailed 
and how acceptance of this belief was related to ethical beliefs. We are an interdisciplinary 
team with expertise in neuroscience, ethics, psychology, population health and anthropology 
interested in the public policy and public health implications of addiction neuroscience and 
our motivations were twofold: first, to offer theoretically informed analyses that contribute to 
a dialogue between advocates of addiction neuroscience, social scientists, neuroethicists and 
the broader public on addiction neuroscience; second, to meaningfully engage with the public 
in shaping social contexts that support the treatment of addicted individuals and minimise the 
harms of drug use (Kearnes et al, 2006; Kurath and Gisler, 2009). 
 
Methods 
Recruitment and interviewing 
 
Following ethical clearance from the University of Queensland Behavioural and Social 
Sciences Ethical Review Committee, 55 qualitative interviews were conducted by a market 
research company during 2011 with a representative sample of individuals residing in the 
Greater Brisbane region of Australia (full details of the study methodology have been 
reported elsewhere (Meurk et al, 2013b)). The interview guide, devised by Assistant 
Professor Jayne Lucke and Dr Adrian Carter in consultation with Professor Wayne Hall, 
investigated participants’ (Table 1) views on addiction, their beliefs about addicted 
individuals’ control and responsibility for their drug use and the treatment and prevention of 
addiction, and their acceptance of the claim that addiction is a brain disease.  
 
The interview began with a broad discussion about addiction in which interviewees were not 
prompted with questions about addiction and the brain. Only after this often extensive 
discussion were participants asked explicitly about their knowledge of, and attitudes towards, 
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the ‘brain disease’ model of addiction. In order to prompt this discussion, interviewees were 
provided with the following information:  
 
One idea that’s been discussed recently by addiction experts is the idea that addiction is a 
brain disease. So the idea that when someone uses a drug repeatedly, it can change the way 
the brain works in ways that are not easily reversed. This has been shown in studies using 
animals and from studies looking at images of the brains of people who are addicted to drugs. 
 
Participants were then asked: 
Before today were you aware of this idea of addiction as a brain disease? 
Do you agree or disagree with the idea that addiction could be a brain disease? 
Why is that? 
Does the idea that addiction could be a brain disease change the way you view someone 
with an addiction? 
Why is that? 
 
As these questions were asked towards the end of the interview, many participants were in a 
reflexive state of mind and they pondered the information given and the questions posed that 
they verbalised to the interviewer. Those who reported prior awareness of the brain disease 
model were asked where they had heard of the idea before and discussed their perception of 
what it meant, based on their prior knowledge. Those who had not heard of this idea before 
were asked to deliberate over its plausibility and its potential ethical entailments. Our aim in 
providing this prompt for participants was not to replicate the knowledge that those with a 
prior awareness may have picked up through the media, their own research or experience. 
Instead, the prompt allowed us to glean information about the processes by which people 
assess, and potentially adopt, novel ideas. By combining the responses of those with prior 
awareness of the brain disease model of addiction with those who did not, we were able to 
develop a nuanced understanding of the deliberative processes members of the public go 
through in assessing scientific claims. 
 
 
Coding and analysis 
 
Our approach to analysis blended the epistemological lenses of psychology and anthropology. 
Responses to questions related to the brain disease statement were read by Dr Carla Meurk 
and a set of codes generated to categorise and quantify: the extent of the sample’s awareness 
of, and agreement with, the brain disease model of addiction; participants’ perceptions of 
ways in which the brain disease model of addiction may affect judgements of addicted 
individuals. Thematic codes were derived that illuminated qualitatively the kinds of 
deliberations and reasoning that participants employed as they considered the relevance of the 
‘brain’ to addiction. Here, we were influenced by the concept of ‘think-aloud’ or ‘talkaloud’ 
approaches that seek to dissect verbalised reasoning processes (Fonteyn et al, 1993).  
 
We used standard thematic analysis to understand the definition and applicability of the term 
‘disease’ to addiction and to identify the entailments participants thought followed from 
viewing addiction as a brain disease. Coding frames were discussed by all authors. Kylie 
Morphett and Professor Wayne Hall validated the coding by corroborating the categorisation 
of data and critically appraising data that had not been coded and excluded from analysis. The 
relevance of any discrepancies and omissions noted were discussed to reach consensus and 
analysis was modestly revised as a result. 
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The influence of a psychological perspective on the production of this text was evident in 
three ways. First, the personal, intimate engagement between participant and researcher 
valued in anthropological and qualitative sociological traditions was not a valued aspect of 
the data collection process that was here outsourced to an external provider (cf. Broom et al, 
2009). Second, high importance was placed on the ‘reliability’ of analysis and double coding 
of data was carried out resulting in a highly structured process for discussing agreements and 
disagreements over coding. Third was the preference for an efficient writing style that 
separated the description of empirical findings from a discussion of their implications. This 
resulted in a less discursive empirical description than is common to anthropological (and/or 
sociological) modes of writing. In imposing restrictions on elaborating from interview 
excerpts within the body of the findings, the present text reacts against an overtly interpretive 
mode of analysis. 
 
 
While both the process of analysis and presentation of findings were distinctive from an 
anthropological (particularly ethnographic) style of investigation and writing, this text 
reflects a post-structural anthropological gaze in prioritising concrete description of situated 
discursive practices over commentary on cultural norms (cf. Van Velson, 1967). In this way, 
the empirical bent of both psychological and anthropological perspectives come together, 
despite different commitments regarding methods of data collection and analysis.  
 
Findings 
 
Neuroscience information in spontaneous depictions of addiction aetiology among 
respondents 
 
 Findings presented here build on our analysis of this sample’s ‘naturally occurring’ 
depictions of addiction – that is, how this sample depicted addiction before being asked 
specific questions about addiction and the brain – reported elsewhere (Meurk et al, 2013b). In 
this previous work, we were interested in conceptualising the ‘impact’ of neuroscience 
information based on the public’s unprompted accounts of addiction aetiology. Consistent 
with others’ findings (Netherland, 2011; Pickersgill et al, 2011; Bröer and Heerings, 2013; 
O’Connor and Joffe, 2013), our interviewees saw the causes of addiction as multifactorial. 
We described participants’ views as arising from various combinations of six causes that, in 
descending order of prevalence, were: ‘character’ (poor choices, lack of willpower and/or a 
weak or addictive personality); ‘emotion-experience’ (a drive for the ‘thrill’ or the ‘buzz’ 
and/or using drugs to escape or erase a traumatic past or obliterate the present); ‘social-
environment’ (linked to certain forms of social dysfunction at various scales from the family 
to broader society and culture); ‘rational-learning’ (resulting from learned behaviour and 
knowledge); ‘biologicalbody’ (linked to genetic predispositions, the brain, an individual’s 
biology and/or ‘chemical imbalances’); and the addictive properties of the drugs themselves. 
We concluded that the layering of different causal factors suggested that although popular 
neuroscientific discourses were readily incorporated into pre-existing understandings of 
addiction, they had not displaced older understandings and so had limited ‘impact’. 
 
 
Having identified these six ‘ontological domains’ (Karasaki et al, 2013) in examining how 
neuroscientific understandings could be said to have ‘impacted’ upon public understandings 
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of addiction, we examine the issue here from a slightly different angle by looking at the 
discursive processes that underpin ‘acceptance’ and how ontological beliefs might shape 
ethical conceptions and vice versa. Initially, 51 per cent of participants identified the ‘brain’ 
as important in understanding addiction. When subsequently presented with the brain disease 
statement, 60 per cent claimed to be aware of the idea that addiction is a brain disease; a 
further 11 per cent claimed partial awareness or were unsure in their responses. A total of 55 
per cent of participants agreed with or accepted the idea that addiction is a brain disease after 
they were presented with the brain disease statement, whereas a further third (38 per cent) 
tempered their agreement by suggesting the brain disease model offered a plausible 
hypothesis or a partial explanation of addiction. Those who claimed prior awareness of the 
brain disease model of addiction reported that this was acquired through some, or all, of the 
following channels: 53 per cent cited that their knowledge came from the media (television, 
news, radio or Internet), 33 per cent through personal networks or experiences of addiction, 
17 per cent from formal education and/or 13 per cent professional experience. 
 
The majority of participants therefore ‘accepted’ the brain as a relevant factor in addiction. 
Yet, an extensive diversity of views underpinned this acceptance as was evident through the 
different deliberative processes employed by participants (Fonteyn et al, 1993). Participants’ 
responses to the brain disease statement afforded the chance to investigate how multifactorial 
beliefs about addiction and addicted personhood are maintained in light of new information. 
 
Deliberative strategies for assessing the idea that addiction is a brain disease 
 
We noted five discursive strategies in participants’ deliberations about the relevance of the 
brain to addiction that may explain why acceptance of the proposition does not lead to a 
displacement of pre-existing understandings or homogenisation of viewpoints. We describe 
these as: compartmental, compositional, hierarchical, relational and colonial strategies. 
Compartmental strategies were used by individuals to explicitly distinguish the brain from 
other factors of causal relevance in order to temper agreement with the proposed idea. Those 
who employed this strategy could discount the importance of the brain compared with other 
factors (such as other ‘mental’ or phenomenological elements) that they had mentioned 
earlier in the interview. For example, although the person below agreed that the brain was a 
factor, they explicitly recapitulated: 
 
… there is this need for belonging and acceptance and fitting in and things like that, so you 
do what everyone else does. So that’s not a brain thing, that’s an emotional thing. 
(female, 40–49, university degree) 
 
Alternatively, this strategy allowed participants to accept that the causes of addiction could be 
both/and or either/or: 
 
I do think addiction does play a part in your brain, yes, I think there’s probably a little section 
in your brain that wants it, and you probably can’t stop that little section from telling you to 
have it. But I think it’s probably willpower on top of the – you can probably stop that little 
addiction, that little brain disease with willpower. (female, 25–29, 
apprenticeship/certificate/diploma) 
 
 
These compartmentalist excerpts explicitly reproduced the views that emotional states are not 
the same as brain states (former excerpt) and that moral agency is not reducible to brain 
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functions (latter excerpt). Thus, they evidently reproduced a lay ontology akin to property 
dualism in which certain mental states and brain states are not seen as being reducible to each 
other. 
 
 
Those who employed what we term compositional strategies in their appraisal used their pre-
existing understanding of the brain’s constitution to support the proposition. Drug use (and 
abuse) was seen as ‘affecting’ the brain’s ‘chemistry’ or ‘wiring’, highlighting multiple ways 
in which the public understood what the brain was – as either a neurochemical or electrical 
object: 
I mean the brain can malfunction because it is actually like a, like a big electrical storm in 
there (female, 60–69, high school) 
 
 
… do I agree with the impact of substance on brain chemistry? Yes, of course it does. (male, 
50–59, university degree) 
 
 
These interviewees both accepted the brain’s role in addiction yet drew on distinct 
understandings of the brain to depict quite divergent understandings of addiction aetiology. 
For one participant, addiction was related to a brain (electrical) malfunction, for the other 
(through reinterpreting the question posed) it pertained to the (chemical) interaction between 
an addictive substance and an otherwise ‘normal’ chemical brain. 
 
 
Hierarchical strategies were used by those respondents who asserted that the brain played a 
central role in the functioning of persons, or indeed as the central site of personhood itself: 
Because the brain controls everything about you. It’s not your heart that cries out nicotine, 
it’s something up here in your head that causes that. So it has to be the brain that controls that 
sort of stuff, just as it controls our thoughts, breathe in, breathe out, when we’ve got pain, 
when we haven’t got pain. The brain tells us that, not the actual body. Okay? (female, 40–49, 
university degree) 
 
 
Hierarchical strategies were closely linked to what we term relational strategies where 
participants accepted the proposition by assigning a particular characteristic that they had 
previously articulated to the brain’s functioning. In other words, these respondents 
reformulated their beliefs to subsume other descriptions under that of brain function: 
[A]ddiction can change the way that your brain works and cause you to continue wanting to 
use a thing. I mean this is what I was talking about with my physiological effects previously, 
mostly. (male, 18–24, secondary school) 
 
 
Compositional, hierarchical and relational strategies all conveyed the extent to which the 
brain could be (but was not necessarily) afforded a central role in understanding addiction, 
and by extension, personhood more broadly. However, we distinguish these approaches from 
the rare cases of ‘colonisation’ (cf. Rose, 2007; Bröer and Heerings, 2013) we observed in 
which participants (as shown below), who reported not having heard of the idea before, 
accepted the proposition in its entirety on the basis of its scientific authority: 
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Respondent: I really hadn’t thought of that side of it. I mean, I know about liver and 
heart and that sort of thing but never had I thought about my brain. […] 
Interviewer: Okay. Do you – would you agree or disagree with this idea? 
Respondent: Well I – I mean if it’s been proven I guess I have to accept it but I didn’t 
know it. (female, 60–69, secondary school) 
 
As she did not possess a relevant pre-existent knowledge base, this respondent found herself 
unable to deliberate over the proposition offered. In the absence of knowledge, she deferred 
to the authoritative (scientific) explanation described by the interviewer. 
 
 
The diversity of strategies used by participants is important. Participants held a variety of 
positions about the centrality of the brain in their understandings of addiction. While some 
respondents said that ‘the brain controls everything about you’ or were willing to subsume 
other processes they had discussed in relation to brain functioning, there were many who 
resisted the central role of the brain (Pickersgill et al, 2011). Furthermore, we detected an 
important difference between those who accepted the brain’s centrality and those who 
appeared to have been ‘colonised’ by a neurobiological conception of addiction. In particular, 
we noted that some prior knowledge of, or beliefs about, the brain could be ‘protective’ 
against colonisation because it allowed the individual to critically appraise the proposition 
rather than feeling compelled to accept it on the basis of scientific authority. 
 
 
Second, broad acceptance of the brain disease model of addiction did not unify, nor 
homogenise, participants’ knowledge on addiction nor addicted personhood. Rather, through 
their various discursive strategies, individuals reproduced heterogeneous ontologies of the 
relationships between brain and mind, including forms of mind/body dualism. However, in 
comparison to their previous discussions in which participants had readily identified social– 
environmental causes of addiction as important (more so than they identified the biological 
body), the brain disease proposition did prompt participants to talk about the addicted 
individual’s makeup – their mental properties and the substance – to the neglect of social– 
environmental causes. In framing the conversation with participants, the idea that addiction is 
a brain disease increased attention to bodily concerns and downplayed social ones. 
 
 
Diverse definitions of disease: Between the biophysical and the ethical 
 
Many respondents who reported ‘partial awareness’ and/or ‘partial acceptance’ of the idea 
that addiction was a brain disease accepted that the brain was an organ of relevance to 
addiction but nonetheless contested the claim that addiction was a ‘disease’ of the brain. 
Many of these respondents gave answers along the following lines: 
 
I don’t know about addiction as a brain disease but I know that it does affect – it affects 
the brain so it changes it. If it’s a disease or not, I’m not sure. (female, 50–59, diploma/ 
certificate/apprenticeship) 
 
Although this respondent (and others like her) accepted that drug use could ‘change’ the 
brain, she remained unsure as to whether this was sufficient to make addiction a ‘disease’. In 
contrast, some participants who accepted evidence that drug use changed the brain also 
accepted that this entailed that addiction was a disease: 
NHMRC Australia Fellowship 569738 award to Professor Wayne Hall 2009-2013 postprint 
9 
 
I think [addiction] has to be [a brain disease]. If it irreversibly effects the way the brain is 
tuned or wired, whatever the right word is, if you change something that cannot be 
changed back then I think you have created some sort of permanent damage and so that 
makes it a brain disease. (male, 18–24, secondary school) 
 
For some, a critical issue in deciding on the appropriateness of labelling addiction as a brain 
disease was whether or not they thought that chronic drug use produced irreversible changes 
in the brain. However, the appropriateness of the definition was also assessed on the basis of 
its possible future moral consequences: 
 
Yeah, [addiction] could be [a brain disease]. I mean, if it got to the point where it wasn’t 
reversible you could see it as a brain disease but isn’t it just kind of like another excuse? 
(female, 18–24, secondary school) 
 
Participants’ division over whether neurobiological change constituted a disease makes 
clear the limited power of neuroscientific knowledge to inform questions of terminology. 
The aforementioned respondent reacted against the idea that addiction was a ‘disease’ on the 
ethical ground that the label might be used as an ‘excuse’ by addicted individuals for drug 
use. Others expressed similar ethical rejections. Some were concerned about how a disease 
labelling may be capitalised on by biomedical industries: 
 
I don’t like the label addiction, brain disease, therefore psychiatrist’s got another 
sub-market to deal with – a drug company’s something, that’s technically what disease 
sub-categorisation does, it just gives another opportunity for industry; i.e. pharmaceutical 
companies, to make another class of drugs. (male, 50–59, university degree) 
 
Not all ethical appraisals of the term disease led to a rejection of the utility of a ‘disease’ 
label. Some reasoned that the label of ‘disease’ was more appropriate because they preferred 
to view addiction in this way rather than as a criminal activity, however, this deliberation was 
decoupled from discussion of neuroscience: 
It’s more of a disease than an actual crime to take the drug, I think. (male, 18–24, 
secondary school) 
 
Participants’ appraisals, and widespread acceptance, of the relevance of the ‘brain’ prompted 
them to articulate diverse ontologies of addiction and addicted personhood. In assessing the 
appropriateness of the term ‘disease’, their thoughts about biophysical processes interplayed 
with deliberations over the ethical and social consequences of using such a label. On the 
matter of the ‘disease’ label, the power of neuroscientific knowledge was strictly limited. In 
fact, in some deliberations neuroscientific knowledge appeared to have only the most 
superficial relevance. Assessment of the appropriateness of labelling addiction a disease 
involved first an assessment of what makes something a ‘disease’ in other contexts, and then 
a comparison of 
what they knew about addiction with what they knew about the other disease exemplar: 
 
Malfunction, like epilepsy, is a brain disease. (female, 60–69, secondary school) 
 
[T]hey are not the same even when they stop drinking. They are not the same person. 
They either change their personality, or something in their brain, it’s gone, damaged, 
ruined. It’s like, I guess, it’s like pneumonia, the more you have pneumonia, the more 
scarring on your lungs you have. Eventually, something’s got to go. (female, 40–49, 
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apprenticeship/certificate/diploma) 
 
Overall, interviewees’ responses suggested they were more prepared to accept that the brain 
processes played a role in addiction (albeit in diverse ways) than they were prepared to accept 
that addiction was a disease. In other words, very few participants rejected the importance of 
the ‘brain’ in addiction but many explicitly questioned the idea that it was a ‘brain disease’. 
 
The ethical consequences of ‘acceptance’ 
 
Participants’ ambivalence about labelling addiction as a ‘disease’ was reflected further in 
their views on the implications of this idea for the way in which addicted individuals should 
be treated. Over half of our respondents (58 per cent) indicated that the knowledge that 
addiction was a brain disease had, or would, change their views of addicted individuals; 
19 per cent were either unsure or thought that this knowledge might partially modify their 
views. Yet, for many participants the empathy expressed for addicted individuals was not 
conditional on how addiction was caused or defined. Empathic responses to the question 
‘does the idea that addiction could be a brain disease change the way you view someone with 
an addiction?’ included: 
No, not really. I've always had like a bit of a soft spot that, you know, like I don't think 
they really wake up and go, ‘I think I might become an alcohol addict’, you know, they 
don't intentionally set out to do that. (female, 40–49, apprenticeship/certificate/diploma) 
I don’t think so. They need help no matter what, don’t they? (female, 50–59, 
apprenticeship/certificate/diploma) 
 
A prominent dissenting view was expressed by others who answered this question by saying 
that addicted individuals were responsible regardless of how addiction was labelled: 
Yep. Yes. [addiction is a brain disease]. But I still think people need to be – and take 
responsibility and accountability for themselves. (female, 40–49, university degree) 
 
I do think – it is – it could be a brain disease. But I mean – it’s – I still say it is a personal 
choice. […] it is an active choice by the person themself. (male, 18–24, secondary school) 
 
 
Some argued, in opposition to those who expressed unconditional empathy, that even if 
addiction was a brain disease, addicted individuals were responsible for becoming addicted in 
the first place: 
 
No not really. Nobody forced them to start drinking or taking the drugs in the first place 
because you weren’t addicted to anything then. (female, 50–59, secondary school) 
 
Only a small minority of our sample (five) behaved in a way that was consistent with the 
predictions of attribution theory in thinking that accepting the idea that addiction was a brain 
disease would make them more sympathetic to addicted individuals: 
 
 
It does because it gives me a more of an understanding of what – if I didn’t have that 
appreciate, I think I’d say, ‘Look guys, just – you know, person’s lack of will and just 
loser and just hasn’t got any control.’ If I understand the impact of the brain chemistry 
on brain chemistry then you tend to want to be a bit more sympathetic because you 
know they have less control. There’s no point saying they should have done – what they 
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should have done before they were addicted but it’s fact now that they’re addicted 
so – yeah. (male, 50–59, university degree) 
 
 
These five respondents accepted the ethical entailments of the brain disease model of 
addiction posited by proponents of neuroscientific explanations of addiction – that is, that 
repeated drug use changes the brain in ways that undermine the ability of addicted individuals 
to make free choices to use drugs or not. However, these respondents’ comments suggested 
that it was their acceptance of a role of neurobiological processes rather than the term 
‘disease’ that affected their viewpoints. 
 
Overall, even though more than half of the respondents thought that the brain disease idea 
would affect their views, the justifications they provided suggested that this belief was mostly 
conceptually decoupled from a neurobiological conception. In other words, the idea that 
addiction is a brain disease did not necessarily resonate with the beliefs that informed their 
moral judgements about addicted persons. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 
By first aggregating (quantifying) their responses and then dissecting them, we uncovered 
considerable diversity underlying purported ‘acceptance’ of ideas regarding the brain and 
addiction in participants’ ontologies of addicted persons and the brain, their definitions of 
disease and the ways in which biophysical knowledge informed their moral judgements of 
addicted persons and vice versa. Moreover, we showed the varied discursive strategies 
through which these differences were reproduced. Our elucidation of such heterogeneity 
highlights the complexity that underlies popular ‘acceptance’ of scientific claims. The 
proposition could resonate with an individual’s pre-existing beliefs in numerous ways that 
were consonant or dissonant (Bröer and Heerings, 2013). Yet, critical appraisal was only 
possible where an individual could recall relevant information about the brain, or about 
disease. Thus, we are led to distinguish between respondents’ articulations of acceptance that 
conveyed neurocentrism and those who conveyed a colonisation of subjectivity because lack 
of prior knowledge prevented them from critically appraising the new information (cf. Rose 
2007; Bröer and Heerings, 2013). 
 
 
The role of the brain in understanding addiction was readily accepted by participants but 
there was more ambivalence about the appropriateness of labelling addiction as a ‘disease’. In 
these deliberations, different discursive strategies were used. ‘Disease’ could be assessed by 
drawing upon neurobiological knowledge about persistent brain changes that could be 
produced by chronic drug use. Others, however, viewed ‘disease’ through a moral lens, 
rejecting the idea because they thought its ethical implications were unacceptable. Finally, 
there were those who compared addiction with images of other diseases and thus considered 
disease in biophysical, but not neurobiological, terms. Neuroscientific insights were shown 
to have limited power in terms of whether or not participants accepted that addiction was 
a disease. There was no ascendant viewpoint as to whether a ‘disease’ was a biophysical or 
ethical entity; it evidently had a diffuse social meaning. 
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The impact of the brain disease model on individuals’ moral judgements of addicted 
individuals appeared to be modest. Although over half considered that the idea that addiction 
was a brain disease would, or had, change(d) their views of addicted persons, this was often 
unrelated to whether they expressed empathy for addicted individuals or held addicted 
individuals responsible for their condition. It was a small minority (n=5) who drew the sort of 
moral implications from a neurobiological conception for which proponents of neuroscience 
hope (Leshner, 1997; Dackis and O'Brien, 2005). 
 
 
Overall, our findings support that of others (Pickersgill et al, 2011; Bröer and Heerings, 
2013; Meurk et al, 2013a) in suggesting that acceptance of a neurobiological conception of 
addiction does not necessarily entail either ontological reductionism or a homogenisation of 
beliefs. Indeed, the dissemination of some neurobiological information may even enhance the 
prospect of more critical appraisals by the public, that is, be ‘protective’ against any feared 
colonisation of subjectivity. Moreover, individuals’ deliberations over ontological and 
normative matters took place in relation to each other but were by no means related in a 
linear or deterministic fashion, that is, beliefs about the body (including the brain) and beliefs 
about ethics could equally inform each other. 
 
 
Taken together, these processes explain how new discourse modestly refashions bodies and 
ethics in a way consistent with Latour’s (2008) notion of ‘design’. Further, this insight into 
how the public supports, or rejects, the biomedicalisation of addictive behaviour usefully 
informs questions of the ethics of health communication. Through the careful and creative 
rearrangement of concepts, a mixture of utilitarian, affective and disciplinary responses – 
medical and punitive – intermingled in individuals’ accounts (Latour, 2008). This lack of 
solidarity in public views regarding empathy or judgement of addicted individuals, as these 
were related to neurobiological concepts, suggest a lay understanding of addiction that is far 
from ‘medicalised’. Although not necessarily opposed to considering the medical aspects of 
addiction, respondents’ views suggest that addiction neuroscience is not necessarily an 
enabling discourse to the medicalisation of deviance (Vrecko, 2010c; Kaye, 2012). 
 
We present our findings to prompt a broader dialogue between addiction neuroscientists, 
neuroethicists, social scientists and the public as to risks and benefits of neuroscientific 
knowledge and brain disease perspectives in reducing stigma and enhancing social support 
for the treatment of addicted individuals. Critics are concerned that neuroscientific 
understandings of addiction may be totalising, reductive and marginalise other ways of 
understanding and treating addiction and thinking about (addicted) personhood (Dingel et al, 
2011). We observed that framing a discussion with the public around the neurobiology of 
addiction did appear to restrict participants’ attention, at least momentarily, to causes that 
reside within the individual (Dingel et al, 2011). In the same ‘moment’, however, in a small 
number of participants, even the limited, verbal, neuroscientific information provided through 
the course of this interview was able to reshape their views in ways that made them more 
empathic to addicted persons. More often, the term disease appeared to play a minor role in 
discussions about the nature of addiction and in participants’ moral judgements about 
addicted individuals. Thus we conclude that exposure to or acceptance of neuroscientific 
information should not be taken to mean one is made subordinate to it. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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What does acceptance mean? Here, through an interdisciplinary lens and a context-based 
analysis, we investigated how 55 members of the Australian public deliberated on a single 
proposition – that ‘addiction is a brain disease’. While quantitative survey questions might 
tell us the extent to which an idea is deemed acceptable, useful or advantageous, it tells us 
comparatively little about how the accepted proposition might be used. Qualitative enquiry 
showed that beliefs about what causes addiction and normative beliefs about addiction and 
addicted persons informed each other; ontological conceptions did not cause particular 
normative entailments in a linear and unilateral way. Thinking about deliberative processes 
of a critical public in terms of ‘design’ allows us to understand how viewpoints take shape in 
a way that preserves both their inherent flexibility and impermanence; it thereby does not 
charge the purveyors of new discourses as attempting or achieving the production of 
monolithic thinking. In this study, we focussed on participants’ responses to their pre-existing 
experiences of mediated information and verbalised information provided to them. We did 
not investigate participants’ responses to visual or textual representations of the brain disease 
model of addiction. The latter is a worthwhile avenue for future enquiry. 
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